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Abstract 
Intellectual Capital (IC) is embedded within a spectrum of corporate activities. Under current 
international financial reporting regulations, many elements of IC are not recognised in the 
financial statements, and are not subject to extensive mandatory narrative reporting 
requirements. However, the narrative reporting context is constantly changing and, beyond the 
regulatory environment, the opportunity to voluntarily disclose IC does exists, within the 
narrative sections of the corporate annual report and other channels of corporate 
communication.  
This chapter explores the costs, benefits, restrictions, and alternative perspectives to IC 
disclosure through a synthesis of evidence obtained from a direct survey investigation of, and 
follow up interviews with, key specialists in UK listed companies.  An analysis of this evidence 
with interpretative commentary, particularly in relation to recent developments in the narrative 
reporting arena, provides a platform from which practitioners and academics alike may 
deliberate the IC disclosure decision.  
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IC disclosure: what benefits, what costs, is it voluntary? 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses the disclosure of intellectual capital (IC). It is possible to identify the 
three stages in the development of IC research in terms of IC disclosure. During the first stage, 
specific disclosures came to be identified as IC disclosures, thus raising awareness. During the 
second stage, generic disclosure theories were applied in the IC context. The third stage 
investigates the disclosure of IC in practice. Within the literature, IC disclosure has been 
examined from a range of philosophical perspectives: positivist, interpretivist, and critical.  
IC refers to intangible resources that create corporate value (Ashton, 2005).  IC is embedded 
within a spectrum of corporate activities, and has been generally categorized into human, 
structural, and relational capital (Meritum, 2002). Human capital encapsulates the knowledge, 
skills, experiences, and abilities of people.  Structural capital includes the value embedded in 
organizational routines, procedures, systems, cultures, and databases. Elements of structural 
capital may be legally protected and become intellectual property rights, legally owned by the 
company under separate title. Relational capital refers to all resources linked to the external 
relationships of the firm, such as relationships with investors, creditors, customers, and 
suppliers.  Relational capital also comprises the perceptions that stakeholders hold about the 
company. Numerous components or elements have been associated with these three categories 
of human, structural and relational capitali.  
Under contemporary international financial reporting regulations, many IC elements are not 
recognized in the financial statements, and are historically not subject to extensive mandatory 
narrative reporting requirements. However, the narrative reporting context is constantly 
changing and, beyond the regulatory environment, the opportunity to voluntarily disclose IC 
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does exist within the narrative sections of the corporate annual report and other channels of 
corporate communication.  
A variety of incentives are suggested in relation to the disclosure of IC information which is 
not captured by the traditional financial reporting framework. The incentives to voluntarily 
disclose information, in general, can be explained in terms of a variety of economic and 
managerial theories, each of which focuses on a different aspect of corporate behaviour. 
Establishing trustworthiness with stakeholders and providing a valuable marketing tool (van 
der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 2001) are prime concerns.  
Capital market incentives such as the opportunity to increase transparency to capital markets 
reduces information risk, leading to strong benefits in the form of a lower cost of capital, 
increased share price and increased liquidity (Richardson and Welker, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001; 
Lundholm and Van Winkle, 2006). The more social exposure a company receives, the more it 
needs to legitimise its existence (Patten, 1991). Through information disclosure, external 
perceptions of legitimacy can be altered and the costs arising from non-legitimacy avoided 
(Deegan, 2000).  Additional economic costs, in the form of, loss of competitive advantage, 
litigation exposure and the direct costs of collecting, processing and disseminating information, 
act as disincentives (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). The competitive disadvantage to disclosure 
is particularly pertinent in the IC context given that IC is a prime source of competitive edge 
in a global market place (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Lev, 2004). Value creation processes 
are potentially highly sensitive, and thus disclosing such information would be a serious 
burden. Importantly, therefore, the management of IC and the disclosure of IC are mutually 
dependent activities in the value creation process with disclosure in itself having the potential 
to create or destroy value (Beattie et al., 2013). In theory, voluntary disclosure of IC 
information will occur if the benefits exceed the costs (Heitzman, et al., 2010). However, due 
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to bounded rationality, all potential benefits and costs might not be taken into consideration by 
corporations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the benefits, costs, restrictions, and alternative 
perspectives to IC disclosure. This is achieved through a synthesis of the evidence obtained 
from a direct survey investigation of, and follow up interviews with, UK listed companies (228 
questionnaire responses and 17 interviews) across finance, marketing and human resource 
specialistsii. This chapter contributes an  analysis of this evidence with additional interpretative 
commentary, particularly in relation to recent developments in the narrative reporting arena, 
providing a platform from which the IC disclosure decision may be deliberated.  
 
2. IC disclosure prior research 
Prior studies have extensively investigated the extent and nature of IC disclosure in corporate 
annual reports. The majority of such studies use content analysis to capture indirectly the extent 
to which different IC components are disclosed to infer their relative importance. Prior studies 
have focused either on a single country setting (for example: Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Brennan, 
2001; Bontis, 2003; Bozzolan et al., 2003; April et al., 2003; Goh and Lin, 2004; Abeysekera 
and Guthrie, 2005; Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Unerman, et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Campbell 
and Rehman, 2010) or across countries (for example: Bozzolan, et al., 2006; Vergauwen and 
van Alem, 2005; Vandemaele et al., 2005; Guthrie et al., 2007). Findings suggest that relational 
capital is generally the most extensively reported IC category (Abeysekera, 2006). In their 
pioneering study, Guthrie and Petty (2000) investigated IC disclosure in the annual reports of 
20 Australian companies. They found 40% and 30% of IC disclosures to relate to relational 
capital and human capital respectively, although overall disclosure was evaluated as ‘low’. 
Employing the same framework, similar studies were conducted in Ireland (Brennan, 2001) 
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and Italy (Bozzolan et al., 2003). Bozzolan et al. (2003) found relational capital to comprise 
just under half of IC disclosures, with particular attention given to customers, distribution 
channels, business collaboration and brands. Human capital made up a smaller proportion, 
21%, of total disclosure.  Guthrie and Petty (2000) related the low IC disclosure levels found 
to the lack of reporting frameworks and the lack of initiative in measuring and externally 
reporting. The potential loss of competitive advantage to disclosure has also been suggested as 
an explanation (Bozzolan et al., 2003).  
 
Subsequent studies have developed and extended the range of components of IC investigated, 
for example Abeysekera and Guthrie (2005). UK studies of this type are relatively few. 
Unerman et al. (2007) and Striukova et al. (2008) use content analysis to investigate IC 
disclosure   across a range of corporate media for 15 UK companies operating in four different 
industry sectors. Relational capital was found to account for 61% of such disclosures with 
information relating to customers making up 20% of total disclosure and being disclosed by all 
companies. Human capital accounted for 22%, including information on work-related 
knowledge and employee information. For a sample of 100 UK listed companies, Li et al. 
(2008) found, based on word count, relational capital to account for 38% and human capital 
28% of total IC disclosures. The most frequently disclosed components were found to be 
customers, relationships with suppliers and stakeholders, market presence, customer 
relationships, and market leadership, with over 90% of sampled firms having disclosures of 
such items. The significance of relational capital was further emphasized in a longitudinal study 
by Campbell and Rahman (2010) who reviewed the annual reports of the major UK retailer 
Marks and Spencer over the period 1978 to 2008. The proportion of relational capital was found 
to vary between 45% and 70% of total IC disclosure, making it the most disclosed category of 
IC throughout the 31year period. Since 2001, rapid growth in relational capital disclosure has 
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been observed, with information on brands, distribution channels, customers, and corporate 
image building being the most frequently disclosed.  
 
The importance and disclosure of IC has also been explored directly using case studies and 
semi-structured interviews on limited occasions (for example: van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Zijlstra, 2001; Chaminade and Roberts, 2003; Roslender and Fincham, 2004; Unerman et al., 
2007). Roslender and Fincham (2004) conducted a series of interviews with senior managers 
in six UK knowledge-based companies. Whilst they note a growing importance attached to the 
long-term value creation aspirations of organizations, they find that understanding, 
measurement and reporting of IC was generally under-developed. Further, external reporting 
was not considered, irrespective of any recognition of the contribution to sustained value 
creation. Unerman et al. (2007) conducted 15 in-depth interviews with UK finance directors. 
Despite some evidence to suggest a balance between informing capital markets and ensuring 
competitive advantage is not compromised, they concluded that the costs to external disclosure 
were not a significant obstacle. Abeysekera (2008) conducted 11 case study interviews when 
investigating human capital disclosure in the annual reports of firms in Sri Lanka, and 
concluded it is made to reduce tension between firm and their stakeholders in the interest of 
further capital accumulation. The questionnaire survey method has seldom been used in the IC 
context. However, Gunther and Beyer (2003) obtained insights from 54 German listed 
companies where limited IC disclosure was associated with reluctance to damage competitive 
position. In summary, from prior research relational capital could be perceived as the most 
important IC category to value creation given the extent of observed disclosure. The IC 
disclosure decision-making process also appears to have the foundation of a benefit-cost trade-
off, the benefits from putting value-creation information in to the hands of various stakeholders 
versus the cost of loss of competitive position.  
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3. Research methods: Who provides the evidence for this chapter? 
IC questionnaire survey evidence referred to in this chapter comes from 93 finance directors, 
55 from companies listed on the London Stock Exchange main market and 38 from large 
companies listed on the AIM market. The industry profile of these companies is shown in Table 
3.1. The industrial goods and services industry is most represented. Whilst certain small 
industries, namely automobiles and parts, food and beverage, and telecommunications, are not 
represented, overall industry profile is closely aligned with the population of domestic UK 
main market companies and the sample of AIM companies surveyed. The average annual sales 
and number of employees for these 93 companies was £561m and 3,108 respectively. Human 
and relational capital disclosure was further explored with 67 human resource specialists (87% 
of whom indicated they held the positions of director or manager of human resources) and 68 
marketing specialists (64% of whom indicated they held positions of director, head or manager 
of marketing/business development). Both human resource and marketing specialists held their 
positions in main market companies. With the exception of automobiles and parts, all of the 
industry classifications are represented in the human resource specialists’ companies (Table 
3.1). There are no marketing specialists from companies representing automobiles and parts, 
basic resources, food and beverage, media, and personal and household goods. Nevertheless, 
industry profiles are not significantly different from that of the population. Human resource 
specialists come from companies with average annual sales of £2,931m and average number 
of employees of 4,337. The marketing specialists come from companies with average annual 
sales of £1,552m and average number of employees of 7,561. Five interviews were conducted 
with finance directors from main market companies included in either the FTSE 100 or FTSE 
250, and six interviews were with companies listed on the AIM market. Two interviews were 
conducted with human resource specialists and four interviews with marketing specialists, all 
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from main market companies. All interviewees appeared hold senior relevant corporate 
positions. 
[Table 3.1 about here] 
4. What elements of IC are most important to value creation? 
The relative importance of the three categories of IC, human, relational and structural capital, 
and their respective components, to value creation is considered in this section.  The overall 
importance of IC to finance directors is emphasised by the finding that over 57% of them 
believe IC contributes to 50% or more of shareholder value. Human capital was ranked as 
providing the highest contribution of all three IC categories with no significant difference 
between structural and relational capital. Various components of these three categories were 
found to contribute to value creation to some extent. However, four components (customer 
relationships; employee skills and education; competitive edge in terms of quality of 
product/service; and company reputation) were considered the most valuable by a clear margin. 
According to the finance director of a FTSE 250 company in industrial goods and services: 
“The only assets we have in our business are our people... our main route to market is a 
combination of our people and their ability to convince clients” (Beattie and Thomson, 2010, 
p.50). It is apparent though that the IC concept is not always considered in terms of the 
individual components that create value. A number of companies appeared to focus on how the 
components come together under a strategy for creating company value. This supports what 
Habersam and Piper (2003) term “connectivity capital”, a linking pin between human, 
structural and relational capital. Mouritsen et al. (2001) highlight the importance of converting 
human capital into structural capital in the value creation process. This was evident from 
finance director responses: “All our products are based on years of research and developed 
knowledge and for everything practically we sell, we depend on patenting and protecting that 
knowledge” (Group Financial Reporter, FTSE 100 Healthcare company, Beattie and Thomson, 
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2010, p.51). Irrespective, the human contribution to company value appears paramount, given 
that, 75% of finance directors viewed a low level of employee turnover to provide a moderate 
to very strong contribution “You can have all kind of intellectual property protections you want 
but basically the knowledge is in the people and therefore our ability to retain those people is 
really key” (Group Finance Director, FTSE 100 industrial goods and services company, Beattie 
and Thomson, 2010, p.51). 
 
Within the human capital category, employee skills and education were viewed as making the 
most important contribution by human resource specialists. This was followed by employee 
commitment, positive employee attitudes, positive employee behaviour, and employee 
motivation. Not surprisingly, human resource specialists attach even more importance to 
employee skills and education than finance directors: “Human capital actually starts with the 
people that we have, the calibre of skills, competencies and experiences that they either bring 
with them or that they evolve and create by the type of work they do with us (Group HR Director 
of a FTSE Small Cap company operating in the industrial goods and services sector; Beattie 
and Smith, 2010, p. 270).  
 
Within the relational capital category, all of the components investigated contribute to 
generating value to some extent according to marketing specialists. The top four components 
(customer relationships; company reputation; competitive edge in terms of quality of 
product/service; and data/knowledge of customers) were thought to be more important than 
anything else. Communication, with which to build relationships and knowledge of customers, 
appeared to be at the forefront of value creation for the marketing specialists: “Knowledge of 
customers is critical to understanding how our customers sell their products to their customers 
and how they market them. So the more you understand about how customers use our 
technology as part of their overall marketing message, the better we can actually promote our 
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next technologies to them” (VP of Marketing, FTSE Small Cap company operating in the 
Technology sector, Beattie et al., 2013). Relationships and communication with customers also 
appears to have additional benefits in acquiring knowledge essential to the development of a 
competitive edge: “Customers are incredibly willing to offer information about competitors’ 
products. So most of it comes from informal feedback from a customer” (Director of Business 
Development, Main-market company operating in the Technology sector, Beattie et al., 2013).  
Marketing specialists attach more importance to the contribution of individual relational capital 
components compared to finance directors, especially in terms of data/knowledge of customers 
and marketing strategies. Such differences in views are not surprising, and are likely to reflect 
the customer-orientated perspective of marketing specialists compared to the shareholder-
orientated perspective of finance directors. 
 
5. Benefits and costs of IC disclosure 
This section considers both the benefits and costs of IC disclosure and the existence of a 
benefit versus cost trade-off.   
Benefits of IC disclosure 
According to the UK finance directors surveyed, the capital market benefits of IC disclosure 
dominate. Disclosing IC information to correct an undervalued share price was considered 
more important than anything else. According to the group financial reporter of a FTSE 100 
healthcare firm, “The attitude of our senior management is to maintain clear communication 
with our investors so that there are no surprises... they want our share price to correctly value 
the business... it’s a very different culture from some aggressive corporates of the past where 
communication has been about enhancing share price beyond what it should be” (Beattie & 
Thomson, 2010, p.55). Increasing the predictability of future prospects was next in terms of 
importance with increasing price/earnings ratio and reducing information risk both being at 
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least fairly important.  The importance of capital market benefits documented here are not, 
however, unique to the IC context since previous research in the US has found voluntary 
disclosure in general to be made to reduce information risk and boost stock price (Graham et 
al., 2005). UK finance directors have previously been found to voluntarily disclose for the 
benefit of obtaining a reputation for openness (Armitage and Marston, 2007). However, in the 
IC context in general, disclosure to promote a reputation for transparent and accurate reporting 
was considered below capital market considerations in terms of importance by finance 
directors. In the words of the group financial controller of a FTSE 250 firm operating in 
industrial goods and services, “We do pride ourselves on being, within reason, as transparent 
as possible to the market, and we hope that stands us in good stead, in terms of the value that 
the market attributes to us” (Beattie and Thomson, 2010, p55.) 
 
Certain companies were driven by the reputational benefits of IC disclosure in terms of 
responding to perceived unethical corporate behaviour.  Communicating IC information to 
customers and other stakeholders was important where the nature of business encouraged it. 
As the group finance director of one FTSE 100 industrial goods and services company put it: 
“We get attacked by various pressure groups outside the organisation saying [the nature of 
our business] is unethical. We have put it [ethics] higher up on the corporate agenda. We 
engage now you know, and we listen and... we change. In the early 90’s the test was if it’s legal 
that’s alright. The test isn’t that anymore, the test is how would it read on the front page of the 
Daily Mail, and would I be happy explaining this to my mum? The test for all businesses is 
much different from where the law sits ... so you end up having to try and inform all those 
opinion formers” (Beattie and Thomson, 2010, p.56).   
According to human resource specialists, attracting and retaining high calibre employees are 
the most important two benefits gained from disclosing human capital information. The 
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disclosure of existing employee reputation is valuable to future recruitment. In this manner, 
value is created “through enhanced reputation and disclosure influences the external perception 
of reputation” (Toms, 2002, p.258).  As the assistant head of employee engagement at a FTSE 
100 firm operating in the banking sector put it: “It’s very important that [company] has as 
strong an external perception and reputation as we can have . . . we have done some work in 
the area of employer branding….the more people know about the good employee practices we 
do, the more they are hopefully likely to work for us” (Beattie and Smith, 2010, p.278). 
 
The majority of finance directors did not rate creating trustworthiness with other stakeholders 
such as employees and customers as a significant benefit to IC disclosure. However, such 
benefits vary according to the type of IC information disclosed, being of more importance in 
relation to human and relational capitals, but not structural capital. According to the marketing 
specialists, the disclosure of customer relational capital information is most beneficial when 
creating trustworthiness with customers. It is also important in both retaining and attracting 
new customers Trustworthiness with potential customers can be achieved by disclosing 
information about current customers. According to the director of business development for a 
main market company operating in the technology sector: “the most powerful way to sell to a 
customer is a reference. You’ll typically always be asked for references within an industry. The 
most credible thing you can do with a customer is say we’ve done the same thing for somebody 
else in the same industry” (Beattie et al., 2013). Through disclosure companies can, therefore, 
borrow their customer’s reputation to add value to their own (Helm and Salminen, 2010). 
Costs of IC disclosure 
A significant cost of IC disclosure is loss of competitive advantage in terms of divulging 
company secrets or otherwise harming competitive position according to finance directors:  
“I’ll describe it [processes, our life cycle, management process] in the generality to investors 
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but the forms we use and how we go about this is proprietary so we keep it... The sector is 
prone to industrial espionage by nations, not necessarily by individuals but by nations” (Group 
finance director, FTSE 100 firm in industrial goods and services, Beattie and Thomson, 2010, 
p. 60). “We find ourselves in the fortunate position where we are probably sort of number one 
or number two in most of the markets we operate in... so we set the precedent for the 
development of the market... so we don’t want to give too much of what we are trying to achieve 
to our competitors” (Group financial controller, FTSE 250 firm in industrial goods and 
services, Beattie and Thomson, 2010, p. 60). The importance attached to the cost of loss of 
competitive advantage reinforces the findings of prior studies in both the UK (Armitage and 
Marston 2007, Unerman et al. 2007) and elsewhere (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra 2001, 
Gunther and Beyer 2003, Graham et al. 2005). 
The potential costs associated with creating unrealistic expectations and a disclosure precedent 
potentially difficult to maintain are also considered important. This is consistent with previous 
findings where Unerman et al. (2007) found that UK finance directors were concerned that 
investors and analysts would develop overly optimistic/pessimistic expectations from IC 
disclosures. The cost of information provision in terms of information collection and auditor 
opinion was also generally viewed as important. 
Although the majority of finance directors surveyed viewed IC disclosure to be fairly to very 
important in terms of marketing their company products, being overtly seen to market via IC 
disclosure created a cost to be avoided in certain sectors. As the financial controller of a 
financial services company on the AIM market observed: “We’re not allowed to market... we 
cannot market... we need to be careful on our annual report about marketing... the FSA could 
clamp down on us and say you are marketing to the general public... talking up [your] products 
too much” (Beattie and Thomson, 2010, p. 56). The group financial reporter in a FTSE 100 
company operating in healthcare had similar concerns: “The promotion and marketing of 
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medicines is something that’s very regulated... legal obligations in terms of selling and 
marketing and promotion of our products... makes it different” (Beattie and Thomson, 2010, 
p.57). These quotes serve to illustrate why it is important to avoid attracting unwanted scrutiny 
from regulators and other stakeholders when disclosing IC information. 
 
Human resource specialists indicated that loss of competitive position was the most important 
cost to disclosing human capital information. As the group HR director of a FTSE small cap 
industrial and services firm acknowledged: “We report in our annual report and accounts 
carefully, because if you have got good people then other people want them” (Beattie and 
Smith, 2010, p.276). The assistant head of employee engagement of a FTSE 100 Bank echoed 
such concerns “We have a strong reputation externally and we place a very high value on our 
human capital team and our human capital strategy, that’s a competitive advantage for us. So 
we would be cautious to some degree in the level of information, the level of detail we would 
share with our competitors externally” (Beattie and Smith, 2010, p. 276).  
Marketing specialists were also most concerned with the costs associated with loss of 
competitive position when disclosing customer relational capital information. “With our 
competitors…..we don’t actually want to tip them off…we don’t necessarily want to beat the 
drum and allow our competitors to go in to win them [new customers] over instead of working 
with us’ (VP of Marketing, FTSE Small Cap company operating in the Technology sector, 
Beattie et al., 2013). “You do get some organisations that will put up an entire list of the entire 
customer base. I’ll never do that. All I do is go to my competitors and I copy those people and 
I go target them, because I now know they use those products’ (Director of Business 
Development, main market company operating in the Technology sector; Beattie et al., 2013). 
A further cost of disclosing customer relational capital exists in terms of eroding 
trustworthiness and relationships with existing customers who wish associated relationships to 
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remain private. This was a major concern raised by the VP of Marketing of a FTSE small cap 
technology company: “We’ll only disclose stuff that is consistent with how they [the customers] 
are going to market and that is very, very important. In principal, the more relationships we 
can talk about the better. However, it’s rather more complex because a lot of the time leading 
brands [our customers] do not want to disclose ….the moment they start saying “well we got 
this technology from here and that technology from there”, that is diluting the strength of their 
brand” (Beattie et al., 2013). 
Benefit versus cost trade-off? 
Beattie and Smith (2012), through a statistical analysis of the finance director responses to a 
long list of benefits and costs associated with IC disclosure identified in previous academic 
literature, conclude that a limited set of benefits and costs are traded-off.  In contrast to previous 
research (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra 2001), the evidence does not suggest strongly 
that the costs of providing IC information outweigh the benefits.  
Finance directors recognise that the benefits from disclosing IC information to investors in the 
capital market must be weighed against putting that same information in the hands of 
competitors. Sixty-two percent agreed or strongly agreed that ‘informing capital markets in 
relation to IC is balanced with the need to ensure that competitive advantage is not 
compromised’ (Beattie and Smith, 2012, p.12). As the finance director and company secretary 
of a chemical company listed on  the AIM market articulated: “I think it needs to be recognised 
in financial reporting that there is a fundamental conflict between confidentiality and 
competitively sensitive information, and providing information to investors... investors want to 
know what that is [competitive advantage] because that helps them to value the business, but 
competitors want to know... in order that they can knock it down and get around it somehow” 
(Beattie and Thomson, 2010, p.60). The existence of a trade off between the benefits of 
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informing capital markets and the cost of loss of competitive advantage is also consistent with 
previous findings (for example: Unerman et al., 2007).  
When specifically disclosing human capital information, the benefits in terms of acquiring new 
human capital are weighed against the cost of losing existing human capital to competitors. 
The benefits of disclosing customer relational capital information are recognised in the form 
of attracting new customers, building trust with those customers, and enhancing corporate 
reputation. However, the trade-off is the associated cost of delivering the sensitive information 
of customer identity straight into the hands of competitors. The director of business 
development for a main market technology company summerised this as follows: “You want 
to have as much information in the hands of your customers as possible and you want to have 
as little information in the hands of your competition as possible” (Beattie et al., 2013). 
However, customer relational capital disclosure not only costs in terms of competitors, it costs 
in terms of damaged relationships with existing customers in situations when there is desire to 
keep associations private.   
 
 
 
6. To what extent is IC disclosure voluntary? 
This section considers the extent that IC disclosure is voluntary. An analysis of both financial 
reporting and narrative reporting requirements is provided. External restrictions outside of 
financial and narrative reporting requirements are also highlighted. 
Financial Reporting Requirements 
According to Roslender and Fincham (2001), it is unlikely that traditional financial reporting 
will be capable of accommodating IC. In the UK, international accounting standards are 
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mandatory for listed companies when producing consolidated group accounts. New UK 
regulation in the form of Financial Reporting Standard 102 is an option for individually listed 
companies.    For IC assets to be included in the statement of financial position (balance sheet) 
the IC assets would have to meet certain recognition criteria, namely that it is probable that 
expected future economic benefits attributable to the asset will flow to the entity and the cost 
or value of the asset can be measured reliably. Additionally, to be recognised, intangible assets 
(defined as ‘an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance’) must meet an 
identifiability criterion. This also has two aspects. First, the asset must be separable from the 
entity and second arise from a contractual or legal right (International Accounting Standard 
38, IASB, 2011; Financial Reporting Standard 102, FRC 2015). Consequently, IC is generally 
excluded from the traditional financial reporting framework because major components do not 
meet several of these criteria (Roos et al., 1998). On average, finance directors disagreed that 
IC reporting could be improved if the capitalisation rules for intangible assets were made less 
restrictive. As the financial controller of a financial services AIM company protested: “Not on 
the balance sheet, because it’s just going to be too subjective and everyone’s going to have a 
different answer”.  
 
 
 
Narrative Reporting Requirements 
Given the exclusion of IC from the financial statements, a narrative disclosure approach has 
become accepted as an appropriate route to take (DATI, 2000; 2002). The financial statements are 
embedded within the annual corporate report which, despite the availability of various alternative 
communication channels, remains a key reporting document (Beattie, 1999).  
It has been increasingly asserted, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 banking crisis, that the 
financial statements should be complemented with narrative information which provides context 
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for the financial information. This narrative information should inform stakeholders of the 
company’s business model in terms of what creates corporate value, including key risks, resources 
and relationships, and also includes key performance indicators (KPIs) already used by 
management to manage the business. This term ‘business model’ increasingly features in the 
business reporting debate. According to Teece (2010), a business model conveys how a company 
converts resources into economic value. It captures all forms of a company’s capital, including 
physical, financial and intellectual, so both the IC concept and the business model concept are 
mutually concerned with value creation. Therefore, IC disclosure is made, at least to some degree, 
through business model description and disclosure. Beattie and Smith (2013) describe the business 
model as the higher-level concept in value creation, driving IC disclosure in terms of what IC 
components are most crucial.    This emphasis on narrative reporting, including business model 
reporting, has become increasingly global as more countries adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards (BIS, 2011; EFRAG, 2010; FASB, 2009; ICAEW, 2009; IIRC, 2013). Indeed, 
the business model is central to the ever-evolving integrated reporting debate where the future of 
corporate reporting is said to depend on the ability to communicate how all forms of capital 
(financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and natural) come together to create value.  
 
In 2010, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued a Practice Statement on 
“management commentary” which recommends that IC resources should be disclosed, 
significant relationships should be identified and discussed, with appropriate performance 
measures also disclosed (IASB, 2010). However, mandatory compliance is not currently 
required, and, in the absence of any detailed rules or guidance, the nature and degree of any IC 
information voluntarily disclosed has the potential to exhibit significant variation across 
companies. A European Commission (EC) directive on the disclosure of non-financial 
information introduced in 2014 has future implications for around 6000 large companies listed 
on EU marketsiii. The directive requires the disclosure of relevant social, environmental, and 
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board diversity information in annual reports from financial year 2017 onwards, capturing a 
degree of IC components. Guidelines are expected to be published by the EC in Spring 2017. 
However, the guidelines are to be ‘non-binding’.    
 
In the UK, the Corporate Governance Code, which is mandatory for listed companies under 
London Stock Exchange rules, requires company directors to ‘include in the annual report an 
explanation of the basis on which the company generates or preserves value over the longer 
term (the business model) and the strategy for delivering the objectives of the company’ (UK 
Corporate Governance Code, FRC, September 2014, p.16). This has been the case since 2010 
and, on this basis IC disclosure could be interpreted as mandatory.  However, the mandatory 
Business Review required prior to 2013 included no specific requirements in relation to 
business models and intellectual capital. The UK Narrative Reporting Statement (ASB, 2006), 
which continued to influence corporate reporting in the UK, also encouraged discussion of 
resources such as IC. Subsequently, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
issued a consultation document in 2011 subsequently proposing that the Reporting Statement 
be revised to replace the Business Review and Directors’ Report with a high-level Strategic 
Report and annual Directors’ Statement. In August 2013, the government amended company 
law and UK listed companies must include a description of strategy and their business model 
in this new Strategic Report (414C, The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Director’s 
Report) Regulations 2013). BIS requested that the UK Financial Reporting Council prepare 
non-mandatory guidance supporting the new legal requirements for the strategic report. This 
guidance was subsequently published in 2014. As the EC requirements are similar to those of 
the Strategic Report, UK companies may also use this guidance to accommodate the EC 
directive (FRC website, 2016).  Although preparing a Strategic Report is mandatory, the FRC 
itself acknowledge that these regulations ‘represent a relatively modest change to pre-existing 
legal requirements’ (FRC, 2014, p.3). With both the UK Strategic Report and the EC directive, 
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where the requirement for mandatory disclosure is accompanied by non-mandatory guidance 
on how to do so, the distinction between mandatory and voluntary is blurred.  
 
Finance directors in the study described here viewed the narrative sections of the annual report 
as being highly appropriate for IC disclosure. Approximately 53% viewed the annual report as 
an effective form for communicating human and structural capital with 46% considering it 
effective for communicating relational capital. Investor and analyst presentations and one-to-
one meetings were thought to be even more effective for communicating all IC forms.  
Approximately 73% of human resource specialists indicated the annual report was effective, 
and it was viewed by them as the most effective form for human capital disclosure. Although 
66% of marketing specialists viewed the annual report as effective in terms of marketing / 
customer relations information disclosure, its limitations were widely acknowledged: “Well 
it’s not the case of it [the annual report] isn’t effective, but it only reaches certain people” (VP 
of marketing for a FTSE small cap Technology company; Beattie and Thomson, 2010, p.127). 
“I absolutely view it [the corporate annual report] as a marketing document. But I understand 
the audience who it’s talking to is very limited to those who want to invest in your company, 
rather than take products out with you” (Head of marketing and UK retail marketing for a 
FTSE 250 financial services company; Beattie and Thomson, 2010, p.127). Marketing 
specialists viewed company web pages as more effective than the annual report, with press 
releases a close contender. “Press releases are bread and butter for us and particularly when 
you look at how the web feeds have developed now. The press release will get quickly dropped 
into any number of e-newsletters and e-zines” (VP of marketing for a FTSE small cap 
Technology company; Beattie and Thomson, 2010, p.128). 
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For finance directors, the preferred nature of disclosure regulation governing the annual report 
was via a best practice statement, rather than mandatory requirements and via principles-based 
guidance rather than detailed guidance/standardisation. The finance director of an AIM 
chemical company explained why: “You can have fifteen companies making soap powder, and 
the soap powder may be almost identical to one another in terms of how clean they make your 
socks; but what will make fifteen companies different, and what will make some of them 
profitable and some of them unprofitable? It will be, how well do they treat their employees, 
do they have good employees, and do they value their good employees? If employees come up 
with good ideas do they implement them? If they have good formulations for new types of soap 
powder, are they effective in getting them into the market as new products, within innovative 
claims that then win market share? All these things are what creates value and each one of 
them will be unique, and that’s going to make it very difficult to quantify or to reflect in an 
annual report in any other way than through some sort of principal narrative disclosure.” 
 
The FRC have subsequently conducted a study on the impact of the Strategic Report (FRC, 
2015). They conclude that business model reporting is still evolving, variation exists across 
companies, and although some companies provide good examples of disclosures explaining 
how corporate value is generated, there is a need for better explanation on what makes 
companies different. Such calls are without doubt aimed at ‘providing the information 
necessary for shareholders to assess the entity’s performance, business model and strategy’ 
(FRC, 2014, p.8). However, the evidence discussed previously in this chapter has already 
underlined that the benefits of IC disclosure to investors are balanced with the cost of loss of 
competitive advantage. On that basis, it is hardly surprising that the FRC finds companies 
reluctant to highlight what that competitive advantage is in their Strategic Reports. It has 
indicated that, in the absence of mandatory rules, IC disclosure remains predominantly 
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voluntary. Further, introducing mandatory rules could be viewed in terms of a ‘double-edged 
sword’. Investor stakeholders may indeed benefit from additional IC disclosure but at what 
ultimate cost to their pockets when loss of proprietary information diminishes value creation 
and potential competitors jump on the corporate band wagon? Consequently, it is well 
documented in the disclosure literature that one of the principal reasons why mandatory rules 
are resisted is the concern regarding the commercial sensitivity of disclosures. 
External restrictions outside financial and narrative reporting regulations 
When considering the costs of IC disclosure earlier in this chapter, it was highlighted that 
industry regulations restricted the voluntary disclose of certain IC information. Examples in 
point were the financial services industries and healthcare where companies were restricted in 
terms of product promoting.  The healthcare sector also seems somewhat restricted in terms of 
disclosing who it provides products to. This was emphasised by the group development director 
of a FTSE small cap company: “We work with [a particular government department], we 
provide services to the [government department], the [government department] as a brand is 
hugely valuable to us but it’s hugely valuable to the [government department] and they will 
therefore in contracts often limit, or try to limit, what we are allowed to say and how we are 
allowed to use the [government department’s] brand in our own materials’ (Beattie et al., 
2013). 
In certain contexts, national legislation prevents the disclosure of, for example, customer 
relationships. The group finance director of a FTSE 100 company operating in the industrial 
goods and services sector provides an illustration: “We operate on the Official Secrets Act and 
the various classifications that come back with that with various work. So we know what we 
can disclose and we know what we can’t” (Beattie et al., 2013). Further, finance directors 
indicated that they are increasingly finding themselves in situations where legal restrictions 
imposed by individual customers prevent customer relationships being disclosed: “Most of our 
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North American customers will now contractually explicitly forbid us to ever use their name 
or the fact that they’d done business with us in any communication without prior consent. 
Constraints placed on us by customers as to how/where/when we are allowed to use 
information about our relationship with them. Typically, this is part of the contract agreement 
and has changed from unusual to normal over the past few years” (Director of Business 
Development, main market technology company; Beattie et al., 2013). However, the existence 
of non-disclosure agreements is not necessarily an absolute barrier: As the VP of marketing for 
a FTSE small cap technology company indicated: “You can’t hang everything back to a 
contract. The reality is these things are never black and white and you’ve just got to understand 
and toe the line” (Beattie et al., 2013). These various external restrictions and regulations 
placed on the IC disclosure decision, arising from customer-specific non-disclosure agreements 
and generic legislation, make mandatory disclosure rules impossible, as two inconsistent sets 
of legal imperatives would result. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Prior indirect content-analytic research, based on the extent of its observed disclosure, suggests 
that relational capital is the most valuable IC category. In the study reported here, using 
questionnaire survey responses from UK finance directors, human capital was ranked as 
providing the highest contribution to value creation overall. Further, employee skills and 
education was in the top four components with three relational capital components (customer 
relationships, competitive edge in terms of product/service quality, and company reputation). 
The overall importance of human capital is consistent with the position taken by the DTI (2003) 
in the Accounting for People Task Force. However, it sits in stark contrast to the findings from 
content-analytic studies, where disclosure is focussed on relational capital.  
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This chapter focuses on benefits, costs and restrictions, and finds that they are unequally 
associated with disclosure across the spectrum of IC information. This explains why IC 
components observed to be disclosed are not necessarily those which are the most important in 
the value creation process. There is strong evidence to confirm the existence of a trade-off 
between benefits of informing capital investors versus the cost of loss of competitive 
advantage. However, the corporate disclosure decision is not entirely within the remit of the 
external financial reporting function, since other functional specialists such as marketing and 
human resources also play a central role in the corporate communication process. The benefits 
of attracting new human capital are traded against the cost of losing existing human capital to 
competitors. Disclosing customer relationship information attracts new customers and 
enhances trust and reputation, but these benefits must be traded-off against delivering sensitive 
customer information to competitors and damaging trust and relationships with existing 
customers. 
The extent to which IC disclosure is voluntary depends on the existence of specific mandatory 
narrative reporting requirements. The IASB’s management commentary is not mandatory and, 
in the UK, although there is a mandatory requirement for a Strategic Report, the accompanying 
guidance is non-mandatory. This same can be said in relation to the EC directive on the 
disclosure of non-financial information. The existence of mandatory reporting requirements is, 
therefore, blurred and IC reporting in corporate annual reports is perceived as predominantly 
voluntary.   However, IC disclosure cannot be said to be voluntary, if private disclosure 
agreements or other legal restrictions / regulations, outside the narrative reporting arena  are in 
place to safeguard highly sensitive information from the public domain. Further, in this  modern 
communication era, Dumay and Guthrie (2017) highlight that both risks  and opportunities 
arise outside the reporting entity via “involuntary disclosures produced by stakeholders and 
stakeseekers” (p.40).  
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In short, IC disclosure decisions are increasingly complex given the spectrum of different 
benefits, costs, trade-offs, restrictions, risks and opportunities in place. This chapter has served 
to emphasise that IC disclosure in itself has the power to enhance corporate value through the 
benefits it brings. However, IC disclosure needs to be carefully managed given the associated 
costs which potentially destroy value. IC disclosure appears to involve successfully negotiating 
a fine line indeed; a fine line which separates value creation and value destruction in this brave 
new narrative reporting world. At the heart of this new narrative reporting world sits IC through 
its contribution to the business model central to the integrated reporting debate, and through 
new narrative disclosure regulation such as the EC directive and the UK strategic report.  Future 
research presents the opportunity to understand how the most importance IC components 
identified in this chapter contribute to the overall business model itself. The opportunity also 
arises to explore the extent it is possible manage the disclosure benefits and costs identified, 
particularly in terms of disclosing competitive advantage in a manner which is both understood 
and satisfies investors, whilst inhibiting replication by competitors. The latter appears to be a 
pivotal issue going forward in the regulation of business model disclosures. Investigating the 
management of “involuntary” disclosures in the value creation process has also been advocated 
as a fruitful new future IC research direction (Dumay and Guthrie, 2017). 
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Table 3.1: Industry classification for the companies of the key functional specialists 
providing questionnaire survey evidence 
 
Industry Sector Finance Directors 
(n = 93) 
Human Resource 
Specialists (n = 67) 
Marketing 
Specialists (n = 67)1 
Automobiles & parts    
Banks 1 2 1 
Basic resources 2 2  
Chemicals 3 2 2 
Construction & 
material 
2 4 3 
Financial services 9 3 6 
Food & beverage  2  
Healthcare 7 3 5 
Industrial goods & 
services 
26 24 20 
Insurance 2 4 1 
Media 8 1  
Oil & gas 5 4 4 
Personal & 
household goods 
1 3  
Real estate 6 3 8 
Retail 6 3 1 
Technology 9 1 7 
Telecommunications  1 1 
Travel & leisure 4 4 7 
Utilities 2 1 1 
Total 93 67 67 
 
Notes: 
1 n=67 because 1 marketing questionnaire was returned anonymously 
 
 
i see Appendix 1 of Beattie and Thomson, 2010 for a list of 128 such components.  
ii This evidence is currently fragmented across several publications (Beattie and Thomson, 
2010; Beattie and Smith, 2010; Beattie and Smith, 2012; Beattie et al., 2013) which 
                                                          
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
individually address separate aspects. This chapter brings a holistic analysis of this evidence 
with new interpretative commentary, particularly in relation to recent developments in the 
narrative reporting arena. Previously unpublished interview material extends the illustration of 
key points being made. 
 
 
iii Companies with more than 500 employees 
